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Special assessments, exactions, and development fees are quickly becoming popular among cities with
development pressure. This article discusses the limitations the courts place on the use of such financing
for infrastructure, thus giving guidance to local officials. Many of the limitations on private financing in-
volve drawing fine legal distinctions in wide "gray" areas, or making decisions when the courts future direc-
tion is uncertain. If local officials are to make informed decisions in such situations, they must understand
some of the legal reasoning that underlies private financing.
Court decisions and other legal limitations have
had a pivotal influence on the use of private finan-
cing for new infrastructure in the United States.
Through the first half of this century, statutory and
case law severely limited the types of infrastructure
that could be financed privately. The courts general-
ly viewed restrictions on private financing as
necessary to protect individual rights. The provision
of most infrastructure was seen as a responsibility
of society; the responsibility of the individual for
financing such infrastructure was through general
taxes, which were established to finance the general
activities of government. Private financing of any
infrastructure that did not provide direct, localized
benefits to those who had to pay for it was seen by
the courts as circumventing the basic system of
public finance. It was also seen as an effort by local
governments to shift financial responsibility for
government activities to specific individuals or
groups in a way that was not justified under such
basic principles of taxation as "ability-to-pay." For
such reasons the courts regularly prohibited the use
of special assessments and exactions to provide
parks, schools, libraries, arterial roads, and central
wastewater treatment and water supply facilities.
In recent years the courts have liberalized their
approach to private financing of new infrastructure.
Previous restrictions on the use of private financ-
ing had failed to recognize the effect of growth on
tax rates and user charges when infrastructure was
publicly financed and had not foreseen the political
results of forcing current residents to bear much of
the cost of new development in rapidly growing
areas. To address those realities, the courts have
allowed the use of private financing to fund a
broader range of infrastructure. In liberalizing the
use of private financing, the courts have shifted em-
phasis from the general principles of public finance
that underlie the tax system to protecting public in-
terests from the effects of private development
decisions.
In making that shift the courts are initiating vital
reforms in the use of private financing. There are,
however, critical questions as to whether the courts
have gone too far and whether they are ignoring im-
portant areas of intergenerational responsibility
(cost-sharing between current and future residents)
that have been established over the years.
First the legal issues associated with the use of
special assessments will be discussed, followed by
the legal issues involved in using exactions and
development fees. Legal reasoning about special
assessments is fairly well established and has
changed little in recent years. Consequently, special
assessments are limited in most instances to their
traditional role of financing specific projects which
provide local benefit, and in most states have been
only marginally beneficial in dealing with the costs
rapid development places on current residents. For
that reason, the discussion of special assessments
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focuses on the types of facilities that can be financed
with them and on possible ways to expand that nar-
row universe. In contrast, the legal limitations on
what can be financed with exactions and develop-
ment fees have changed dramatically in recent years.
These changes have made exactions and develop-
ment fees an effective tool in dealing with the fiscal
impacts of new development in rapidly growing
areas, but they also raise questions about their ap-
propriateness in slow growing areas.
Criteria for the Use of Special Assessments
The legal foundations for special assessments
were firmly established at the beginning of this cen-
tury and have changed little since then. In fact, the
language contained in many of the early twentieth-
century court cases was so strong that it has been
virtually impossible to use special assessments to
solve some of the problems communities now face
in financing new infrastructure.
Writing in 1898, when the U.S. Superme Court
handed down a landmark decision that established
modern principles of special assessments, Victor
Rosewater described three legal phases in the evolu-
tion of special assessments. 1
In the first phase, special assessments were viewed
as exercise of police power. They were introduced
as a way of eliminating public nuisances, and they
could be used only after the property owner was
given the opportunity to eliminate the nuisance on
his own. The second phase in the evolution of
special assessments, also an exercise in police power,
involved the use of local governments' condemna-
tion powers or powers of eminent domain to acquire
the rights of way for new streets and roads. Special
assessments were used to recover the public costs
of land acquired under eminent domain power from
those who benefitted. This second phase in the use
of special assessment left the communities without
a way of financing improvements to the newly ac-
quired public rights-of-way. The need for local
revenues to improve and pave new streets ushered
in the third phase in which special assessments are
justified as a use of taxing rather than police power.
It is this third phase that characterizes the use of
special assessments today.
Restrictions on the Use of Special Assessments
As an exercise of taxing powers, special
assessments must be specifically authorized by the
state either through enabling legislation or constitu-
tional provision. Without such authorization, they,
mm
.
like most other taxes, are routinely rejected by the
courts as an illegal exercise of revenue collecting
powers. Even in states such as California, where the
courts have accorded broad revenue powers to
localities under home rule, special assessments re-
quire specific authorization, because the courts have
determined that the state has preempted local
governments in regulating the use of such financ-
ing. Some of the difficulties that local governments
are likely to encounter with existing enabling legisla-
tion include the following: grants of special assess-
ment powers to particular levels of governments,
(such as cities, counties or specific types of indepen-
dent special districts); limits on the use of
assessments to particular types of infrastructure,
(such as roads, sewer extensions, and sidewalks);
prescriptions on specific ways of allocating costs ot
different types of property, (such as front footage
or acreage charges); and restrictions on the govern-
ment's ability to borrow against the revenues. In
authorization powers
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tax distinctions
defining special benefits
most states, legislatures have been willing to change
special assessment laws regularly to meet com-
munities' needs.
Uniformity
Although special assessments are viewed as an ex-
ercise of taxing power, they are distinguished from
general taxes, which must be imposed at uniform
rates. In most states, either constitutions or statutes
require that local governments impose taxes
uniformly throughout the jurisdiction. In states
which allow property to be "classified" for proper-
ty purposes, taxes must be uniform on all similarly
classified property in the jurisdiction. 2 Uniformity
requirements are an effort to guarantee that all peo-
ple who are in essentially similar situations are taxed
at the same rate throughout a jurisdiction. Further-
more, "reasonableness" required under the due pro-
cess clauses of the federal and state constitutions is
often measured by the degree of uniformity exer-
cised by a municipality in imposing taxes. Special
assessments clearly do not satisfy such uniformity
requirements, since they are imposed in special
assessment districts that do not encompass entire
jurisdictions. To overcome such difficulties the
courts established the concept of "special benefits"
to distinguish infrastructure that could be legally
financed with special assessments from infrastruc-
ture that had to be financed through uniformly im-
posed taxes. Special benefits were defined as benefits
from public improvements that increase property
values. In affirming the reasonableness of special
benefits, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1898 in Nor-
wood v. Baker ruled that:
. .
.
the principle underlying special assess-
ments to meet the cost of public improvements
is that the property upon which they are im-
posed is peculiarly benefitted and, therefore,
the owners do not, in fact, pay anything in
excess of what they receive by reason of such
improvement. . . .
Norwood and similar cases in the early part of this
century established the basic criteria under which
special assessments could be used. 3
The definition of "special benefits" has proved
more useful as a theoretical concept for justifying
special assessments than it has as a criterion for
determining where special assessments can be used.
The problem with the formal legal definition of
"special benefits" is that all infrastructure, regardless
of size or scale, tends to increase the value of pro-
perty, as has been indicated by recent research in
public finance. 4 In trying to operationalize the con-
cept of special benefits, the courts in the past half-
century have come up with two criteria for deter-
mining when infrastructure provides "special
benefits" and when it provides "general benefits." The
first is to provide benefits to some properties at levels
in excess of those provided by the city to all pro-
perties. The second is to define infrastructure as pro-
viding "special benefits" when the benefits of a
specific facility are primarily local. Many courts
have used this second criterion to prohibit the use
of special assessments to finance infrastructure that
provides benefits that accrue to all of society (such
as educational benefits), as well as to prohibit special
assessment financing based on the scale of a pro-
ject. This criterion has been used effectively to
justify the private financing of localized im-
provements that involve dramatically different costs
in different parts of a city, due to such factors as
the density of the development and types of land
use in an area. Mandelker et. al. summarize the use
of special assessments by noting:
All such assessments have one common ele-
ment: they are for the construction of local im-
provements that are appurtenant to specific
land and bring a benefit substantially more in-
tense than is yielded to the rest of the munici-
pality. The benefit to the land must be actual,
physical and material, and not merely specula-
tive or conjectural. 5
Since the above criteria involve making relative
judgments, courts in various states have interpreted
specific situations differently. The potential user of
special assessments should refer to the precedent set
in his particular state and to the more detailed
discussions of specific cases found in most legal texts
and case books on local government law. 6
Allocating costs through assessments
In allowing the use of special assessments to
finance infrastructure that provides special benefits,
the courts have required that properties be assessed
for costs in proportion to the benefits they receive,
and that the revenues from the assessment not ex-
ceed the cost of the infrastructure being financed.
The courts have allowed a great deal of discretion
in the allocation for costs among benefitted parties,
requiring only that the assessment formula approx-
imate the proportion of benefits received. The rela-
tionship does not have to be exact. The courts have
Winter 1985, vol. 11, no. 2 15
consistently accepted general rules of thumb, such
as front footage or acreage, for allocating costs and
generally have left the determination of reasonable-
ness up to legislative discretion. 7 When properties
that do not directly abut an improvement or that
receive only indirect benefits from an improvement
are assessed a portion of the cost of the improve-
ment, the assessments are often challenged in court
on the grounds that the assessed properties receive
no special benefit. But recent decisions have upheld
such assessments. Typical are the arguments of a
California court:
. . . Land may be included within an irriga-
tion district, even though such land cannot
legally receive any surface delivery of water
from the district, since the land will be benefit-
ted by the increase in ground water due to
delivery of water on neighboring lands and
will also increase in value because of the
general increase in value of land within the
region due to availability of water. 8
Similarly, a South Carolina court upheld an assess-
ment on property that was more than a mile from
a sewer line, because the assessment was based on
indirect benefits:
. . . Indirect benefits which may accrue
within the subdistrict include enhanced pro-
perty value resulting from decreased distance
to sewer disposal lines, proximity to well
developed centers and generally improved con-
ditions of sanitation and public health throug-
out the area. 9
In the South Carolina case the court also upheld the
legality of subdistricts with differential assessment
rates within the special assessment district. Further-
more, courts generally have not restricted
assessments to one-time charges imposed at the time
of construction, which is typical of most special
assessments, but have upheld ad valorem
assessments (based on either the value of all real pro-
perty or the value of land), connection charges, and
development fees. 10
The primary trouble with limiting the use of
special assessments (or exactions, development fees,
or any other form of private finance) to infrastruc-
ture is that it limits a city's ability to shift some of
the burden of financing area-wide facilities like
arterial roads and sewage treatment facilities to
developers. Because of such restrictions, exactions
and development fees have been more effective tools
for dealing with the impacts of rapid growth.
Exactions and Development Fees
Throughout their history, exactions have been
viewed as an exercise of police powers. Develop-
ment fees, on the other hand, can be viewed as
an exercise of either police or taxing powers. The
type of power underlying exactions and develop-
ment fees determines the legal limitations and legislation activity
restrictions placed on them. In most states, cities required
have chosen to impose development fees under
police powers because taxing powers require ex-
plicit authorization by enabling legislation.
Generally, such legislation does not exist. The
most notable exception to this is in California,
where development fees are commonly imposed
under taxing powers. In other states, develop-
ment fees have been routinely overturned by the
states where they were based on taxing power,
either because of the lack of enabling legislation
or because of the failure to comply with the con-
stitutional provision of equal protection and due
process.
Exactions and Development Fees
as Police Powers
The power to require exactions (dedication of
land or facilities) is derived from the power to
regulate land use authorized under zoning and sub-
division enabling legislation. In all states, the courts
have ruled that the police powers granted in zoning
and subdivision enabling legislation are adequate
to require dedications of infrastructure. In many
states enabling legislation explicitly authorizes
dedications of certain types of infrastructure in order
to protect public health and safety. In other states
enabling legislation grants only the power to limit
and restrict the use of land in order to protect public
health and safety, but the courts have ruled that re-
quired dedications of local streets and utility lines,
for example, are authorized under such legislation.
When imposing fees in lieu of dedication or de-
velopment fees that are independent of dedication,
most cities have also relied on the general grants of
police power in land use enabling legislation. Such
efforts have usually met with success, but not
always. In several states, courts routinely have ap-
plied Dillon's rule, which requires explicit enabling
legislation for powers granted to local governments. fee imposition
Alabama and Illinois are two such states, and in
both states the courts overturned fees in lieu of
dedications, citing inadequate enabling legislation.
In Alabama the court invalidated an ordinance re-
classifying infrastructure
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quiring subdivision developers to either dedicate
0.18 acre per dwelling unit constructed or to pay a
fee in lieu of dedication to fund public parks and
playgrounds, noting only that the enabling legisla-
tion did not "specifically authorize the commission
to require the payment of a fee in lieu of the dedica-
tion of the land as a condition of approval of a sub-
division plat."11 In Illinois the court struck down a
condition that a subdivider pay $325 per lot for
educational purposes, stating that:
. . . regardless of advantages of flexibility in
equalizing financial burdens that might be
secured by substituting monetary charges for
the dedication of land, . . . the plain fact is
that the statute does not authorize this techni-
que. 12
In contrast, the courts in Colorado, Florida, New
Jersey, Oregon, Utah, and many other states have
upheld development fees that are completely in-
dependent of dedications and which have not been
specifically authorized by the state. 13 Decisions in
those states have upheld such fees as valid uses of
police powers contained in zoning and subdivision
enabling acts, even when not explicitly authorized.
The Reasonableness Standard
The requirement of reasonableness under due
process has emerged as the primary standard for
determining what types of infrastructure can be
financed with exactions and development fees. Over
the years three tests of reasonableness have emerged:
(1) whether the need for the infrastructure is
"specifically and uniquely attributable" to the new
development, (2) whether there is a "reasonable rela-
tionship" between the public need and the conditions
imposed on the developer, and (3) whether the ex-
action or fee would be used to the benefit of
residents of the new development (the rational nexus
criterion).
The "specifically and uniquely attributable"
criterion is the most conservative and restrictive of
the three. In 1961 in the now-famous Pioneer Trust
and Savings Bank v. Village ofMount Prospect case,
the Illinois court invalidated a requirement for
dedication of land for educational purposes, on the
grounds that the need for schools was created by
the total development of the community and could
not be specifically and uniquely attributed to the
new development. 14 Until it was superceded in many
states, this criterion was used extensively in prohib-
iting the use of exactions and development fees to
(1) finance infrastructure that provided community-
wide benefits, such as schools, parks, and recrea-
tional facilities, and (2) to finance roads and utilities
that, because of their size, provided benefits to those
outside a development. The criterion served essen-
tially the same purpose that the special benefit
criterion served for special assessments. It limited
exactions and development fees to financing in-
frastructure that provided local benefits, and it made
new residents pay, like all other residents, through
taxes and utility charges for infrastructure that pro-
vided community-wide benefits. Because of the
severe restrictions on what can be financed with ex-
actions and development fees under the "specifical-
ly and uniquely attributable" criterion, however,
new development still can impose an excessive
burden on current residents in rapidly growing areas
that do not use pure "pay-as-you-use" financing, as
was the case for special assessments.
The Reasonable Relationship Criterion
From a regulatory or police power perspective,
the reasonable relationship criterion is at the op-
posite end of the spectrum from the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" criterion. It is the most per-
missive of the three. This criterion was established
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in 1949 by the California Supreme Court in Ayers
v. City Council of Los Angeles. 15 In Ayers the court
upheld a requirement for dedication of a road abut-
ting a subdivision that provided benefits to the com-
munity as a whole as well as to the development.
The court required only that a reasonable relation-
ship exist between the conditions imposed on the
developer and the public needs generated by the new
subdivision. The reasonable relationship criterion
has been used only with regard to exactions, not
development fees, and has been used principally to
justify the exaction of roads and utility lines that
either lie on or directly abut a development site.
The Rational Nexus Criterion: The
Current Basis of Development Fees
The third criterion used in determining what can
be financed with exactions and development fees is
the rational nexus test, which conceptually lies be-
tween the other two criteria. The rational nexus
criterion was first stated in ]ordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls in 1966 and has become the basis
for most development fees in use today 16 In Jordan
the court upheld a requirement for dedication, or
fee in lieu of dedication, for school and parks, based
on the costs of the portion of the facilities that was
needed by the new development. In upholding the
exaction and fee, the court directly aimed at the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" criterion,
which was the standard of the day, stating that it
was virtually impossible for a municipality to prove
that a new development was the sole beneficiary of
public facilities. The court's alternative criterion was
that only a "reasonable connection" had to exist be-
tween the costs borne by the new development and
the needs it created. Under this rational nexus
criterion the new development does not have to be
the only one that benefits from a facility: what is
important is that the revenues from the development
fees be used to the benefit of those who pay them.
The "rational nexus" criterion is more restrictive than
the reasonable relationship criterion because new
development is liable only for a portion of the costs
of the facility needed by the development and not
for the total cost of infrastructure from which it only
partially benefits. The criterion is less restrictive
than the "specially and uniquely attributable" cri-
terion, however, because new development is re-
sponsible for a portion of the cost of all infrastruc-
ture that is needed to serve it and not just for the
cost of the infrastructure that serves only that
development. The fact that rational nexus can be
used to justify developers financing of all types of
infrastructure was explicitly reaffirmed by the
Florida court in 1982 in Home Builders and Con-
tractors Association of Palm Beach v. The Board of
County Commissioners of Palm Beach, when it
found that the validity of development fees de-
pended "not on whether the money is spent on utili-
ty systems, roads or other public services," (i.e. on
equity problems
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possible solution
multiple issues involved
a specific type of infrastructure), but rather on
whether it was spent for the benefit of the develop-
ment paying the fee.17
While the rational nexus criterion has gained fair-
ly wide-spread acceptance in recent years, there are
still several important issues that are overlooked by
the courts when they apply a strictly regulatory or
police power perspective to infrastructure finance.
In some areas the courts are starting to realize that
there is a public finance side as well as regulatory
perspective to these issues, and they are starting to
raise questions that go beyond the narrow approach
of the rational nexus criterion.
Problems with Rational Nexus
There are two main problems inherent in applica-
tion of the rational nexus criterion.
The first difficulty with rational nexus is a dou-
ble payment problem. This problem occurs when
exactions and development fees are used to finance
infrastructure that traditionally has been publicly
financed with taxes, utility fees, and the like. In such
a situation new development pays the full cost of
its own infrastructure through exactions and de-
velopment fees, yet it still pays taxes and utility fees
that finance the infrastructure which serves current
residents. In essence, residents of new development
pay taxes and utility fees as current residents do,
yet they receive no infrastructure in return since
theirs was paid for through exactions and develop-
ment fees. This problem was recognized by the Utah
Supreme Court in 1982 in Lafferty v. Payson City.
The court said a development fee based on the ra-
tional nexus criterion was not equitable
. . . since it fixes the entire cost of new
facilities on newly developed properties with-
out assurance that these costs are equitable in
relation to benefits conferred and in com-
parison with costs imposed on other proper-
ty owners in the municipality. For example,
if the costs of maintenance and repayment of
bonded indebtedness for construction of the
existing system are being financed by general
tax revenues, service fees, and other payments
collected from the entire municipality — in-
cluding the newly constructed homes — the
new homes will be burdened with all of the
capital costs of expanding the service capaci-
ty plus a portion of the costs of the existing
one. In an effort to avoid this kind of un-
fairness
. . . requires a different approach
that imposing all costs of expansion of capaci-
ty on newly developed properties. 18
The solution to part of the double payment problem
is to deduct from development fees the present value
of taxes and other payments made by the new
development toward outstanding debt on existing
infrastructure. If replacement of infrastructure is
publicly financed, the development fee also needs
to be reduced by the present value of taxes and other
payments that will finance replacement of the
already depreciated portion of existing infrastruc-
ture. In Florida many cities and counties are already
making the first of these two adjustments. Palm
Beach County's park fee, upheld in Builders and
Contractors of Palm Beach County in 1982 — the
year of the Lafferty decision — contained just such
an adjustment.
The Dominance of Intergenerational Equity
The other major problem in applying the rational
nexus criterion is more fundamental. The criterion
fails to recognize that multiple issues are involved
in financing different kinds of new infrastructure.
In particular, the rational nexus criterion assumes
that (1) there is intergenerational inequity — cur-
rent residents paying for infrastructure that serves
residents of new development — whenever in-
frastructure that provides benefits to new develop-
ment is publicly financed; (2) that such intergenera-
tional inequity is eliminated when infrastructure is
privately financed with development fees; and (3)
the improved intergenerational equity achieved
through use of development fees is more important
than the benefits of having infrastructure publicly
financed redistributed among all members of socie-
ty, including new residents of a city, by ability-to-
pay rather than by benefits received.
These assumptions hold intergenerational equi-
ty as paramount in importance over all other issues,
such as distributional equity among income classes.
Decisions about how to finance infrastructure,
however, should involve careful weighing of all
issues and should be made independently for each
type of infrastructure. Instead, under the rational
nexus criterion, intergenerational equity is given
priority over all other issues in the financing of new
infrastructure development.
Traditionally, much of the infrastructure that has
been publicly financed has been built and paid for
by one generation on behalf of the next generation.
Whenever financing of infrastructure is not on a true
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Preparing the land
pay-as-you-use basis, part of the cost of infrastruc-
ture that serves new development is paid by current
residents. In turn, the new residents are expected to
pick up some of the cost of future development
when it occurs. Under the rational nexus criterion,
having current residents pay any costs of infrastruc-
ture that benefits new development is considered in-
equitable. That is in sharp contrast with well-
established traditions of intergenerational sharing
that has been an accepted part of public finance for
years. Most people consider the sharing of costs be-
tween generations inequitable only when the burden
of new development on current residents is ex-
cessive. Under the rational nexus criterion, however,
any burden is deemed excessive. When this criterion
is applied as the standard of intergenerational equi-
ty, most recent development receives a windfall, in
that much of the cost of the infrastructure built to
serve it was paid by prior residents, but the residents
of recent development have no responsibility to fund
infrastructure for development. Consequently, it is
not necessarily inequitable, as assumed under ra-
tional nexus, if existing residents pay for infrastruc-
ture for new residents when infrastructure is
financed with such traditional methods as taxes.
Neither would a shift of responsibility to the
developer for all infrastructure serving his develop-
ment imply improved equity.
Furthermore, when the courts apply the rational
nexus criterion to determine if development fees are
regulations or taxes, they place issues of intergenera-
tional equity above all the public finance issues
associated with taxing powers. The courts make no
effort at balancing intergenerational equity issues
with other public finance issues when deciding if
development fees are regulations or taxes on the
grounds of who benefits from financed infrastruc-
ture. Instead, they make a decision based solely on
the grounds of the police powers contained in land
use regulations, which allow cities to regulate new
development if it is deemed detrimental to current
residents. But when the impacts of new development
are fiscal, there are issues of taxation and public
finance that cannot be ignored.
To demonstrate the narrow approach of the courts
in this regard, it is helpful to look at the financing
of schools. The traditional source of school funding
is the property tax. Under property tax financing,
owners of commercial, industrial, and higher in-
come residential properties help subsidize schools
in low income neighborhoods. Such financing is
often justified on the ability-to-pay principle, in
which those with the greatest ability to pay, con-
tribute the greatest amount to general government
activities. When the courts allow development fee-
financing of schools on the grounds of rational
nexus, redistribution of school costs is a moot point,
since school costs are distributed based on who
benefits. While such financing may reduce the im-
pacts of new development on tax rates, it also under-
mines the redistribution that is inherent when taxes
are used to finance schools. The courts make no ef-
landmark case
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fort at weighing these costs of development fee
financing against improved intergenerational equity.
Broadening Rational Nexus
In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court in Banberry
Development Corporation v. South Jordan City
recognized some of the broader public finance ques-
tions that should be considered by the court when
determining the reasonableness of development
fees. 19 The court ruled that "to comply with stan-
fee restrictions dards of reasonableness, a municipal fee . . . must
not require newly developed properties to bear more
than their equitable share of the . . . costs in rela-
tion to benefits conferred." The court then suggested
seven factors that should be considered when mak-
ing such an evaluation:
1) the cost of existing capital facilities; 2) the
manner of financing existing capital facili-
ties . .
.
; 3) the relative extent to which the
newly developed properties and other proper-
ties in the municipality have already con-
tributed to the cost of existing capital facili-
ties . .
.
; 4) the relative extent to which newly
developed properties and the other properties
in the municipality will contribute to the cost
of existing capital facilities in the future; 5) the
extent to which the newly developed proper-
ties are entitled to a credit because the
municipality is requiring their developer or
owner ... to provide common facili-
ties . . . that have been provided by the
municipality and financed through general
taxation or other means ... in other parts
planning basis of the municipality; 6) extraordinary costs, if
any, in servicing the newly developed proper-
ties; 7) the time-price inherent in fair com-
parisons of amounts paid at different times.
In laying out the above factors the court made no
attempt to apply them, leaving that to the
municipality. In Lafferty the court said,
If properly applied, those seven factors should
put the new homeowner on essentially the
same basis as the average existing homeowner
with respect to costs borne in the past and to
be borne in the future, in comparison with
benefits already received and yet to be
received.
Limitations on Fees Under Rational Nexus
The rational nexus criterion is the current stan-
dard in most areas, and any city officials consider-
ing development fees should be aware of the condi-
tions courts have placed on its use. Most of the
restrictions have to do with how the fee is set and
how the revenues are used. One of the best sum-
maries on such conditions occurs in Home Builders
and Contractors Association of Palm Beach Coun-
ty, where the 15th Circuit Court of Appeals of
Florida summarized the conditions laid down by the
Florida Supreme Court in 1976 in Contractors and
Builders Association v. City of Dunedin. In this
landmark case, the Florida Supreme Court upheld
development fees under the rational nexus criterion.
The conditions since have come to be known as the
"Dunedin Test":
1. New development must require that the pre-
sent system of public facilities be expanded.
2. The fees imposed must be no more than
what the local government unit would incur
in accommodating the new users of the
system. 3. The fees must be expressly ear-
marked for the purposes for which they were
imposed. 20
Fees Cannot Benefit Current Residents: The first
requirement prohibits the use of development fees
to fund the portion of facilities that benefits current
residents or residents of other communities or to
fund deficiencies in the current system. In some
states this requirement also may prohibit the use of
development fees to pay for facilities that were built
before the fee was established, and possibly those
built before fees were collected, even if such facilities
were specifically built with excess capacity to accom-
modate growth An example of such an application
of this requirement is in Mitchell and Best Co. v.
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, where
the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Mary-
land, overturned a "systems expansion offset charge."
The charge went to retire indebtedness for an ex-
isting sewage treatment plant that served those pay-
ing the fee. 21
Proportionality: The second requirement limits
the fee to the financing of the proportionate share
of cost of a facility that serves those who pay the fee.
Separate Accounting: The third requirement is the
one that is most often used by the courts in in-
validating fees. It requires that revenues from fees
be maintained in separate accounts from other
revenues and that they be spent specifically for the
benefit of those who paid them. In 1983 in Cz'fy of
Fayetteville v. IBI, Inc, the Arkansas Supreme Court
ruled further that development fees must be spent
within a reasonable time or be refunded. 22
continued on page 51
Winter 1985, vol. 11, no. 2 51
continued from page 20
Planning Considerations: Other limits that the
courts have placed on development fees include that
they be based on reasonable planning documents
and studies and that there be adequate provision for
those who pay the fee to challenge the criteria upon
which the fee is based. In City of Fayetteville the
court ruled that the city's park fee was not based
on a sufficiently definite plan for parks to justify
the imposition and the amount of the fee. The court
pointed to the need for "reasonably definite" plans
for spending the fee and for refunding the fee if areas
do not develop as expected. This points to the need
for coordinating fees with comprehensive plans and
capital facility plans in determining both the level
and expenditure of the fee. Since development fees
adopted under police powers are regulations rather
than taxes, there must be sufficient room to take ac-
count of special situations. Julian Juergensmeyer, a
noted land use attorney at the University of Florida,
has stated this very effectively by noting that:
In place of a rigid and inflexible formula for
calculating the amount of the fee to be im-
posed on a particular development, a variance
procedure should be included, so that the local
government may consider studies and data
submitted by the developer to decrease his
assessment. 23
In summary, the legal foundations for develop-
ment fees are just evolving. There are many issues
that the courts have to address, and it is likely that
many of the current rules for determining the legali-
ty of fees will change as the courts begin to grapple
with the more complex issues associated with them.
The current rule used by most states in determin-
ing what can be financed with development fees is
the rational nexus criterion. Under that criterion,
cities can use fees to finance the pro-rata share of
the costs of all infrastructure that benefits new
development. This is a fairly liberal interpretation
of police powers and allows cities to use develop-
ment fees to address many of the fiscal problems
associated with rapid growth. On the other hand,
rational nexus allows cities to shift costs that should
be considered a city-wide responsibility to the
developers. Because of this evolving legal status,
cities are advised to use a fair degree of discretion
in deciding not only if they wish to use development
fees, but for what type of facilities they may be used.
The research for this article was supported by Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) contract
#HC-5626, Financing the Public Cost of New
Development. Q
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